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Abstract: Two cases of evolutionary stable strategy with periodic payoffs 
are studied. The first is a generalization of Uyttendaele et al. The second 
is prisoner's dilemma with periodic payoff. It is shown that reducing the 
defection payoff by a periodic term is sufficient to introduce cooperation 
provided that the initial fraction of cooperators is greater than 0.6. 
 
1. Introduction: 
Seasonality is an important phenomena in biology. Yet studying 
evolutionary games [Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998 and Maynard Smith 
and Price 1978] with periodic payoffs is still in its infancy [Uyttendaele et 
al 2012 and Broom 2005].  
 In sec.2 the work of Uyttendaele et al will be generalized to the 
case 11   and  which has not been studied. In sec.3 the case of 
prisoner's dilemma game with periodic payoff will be introduced. 
 
Sec.2 generalized Uyttendael et al case: 
 Uyttendaele et al have studied evolutionary game with payoff 
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numerically. The replictor dynamics equations are 
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We will study the case 1  which was not considered in their paper. 
The equilibrium solution implies: 
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To study the time dependent case we set 
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and linearize in  . We get 
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 In this case all strategies co-exist.  
 
Sec.3 Prisoner's Dilemma game with periodic payoff: 
 Prisoner's dilemma game is a classic model for cooperation 
between selfish individuals [Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998]. Its payoff 
matrix is given by 
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The evolutionary stable strategy is defect (p=0). The reason for this 
negative result is the condition U>S. This negative result has been 
corrected by the following mechanisms: Relatedness, memory and 
inhomogeneity [Shehata 2011].  
 Here we ask the following question: If a periodic term is added to 
reduce U will this introduce a kind of cooperation? Consider PD game 
with the following payoff matrix 
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The replicator dynamics equation is 
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Solving (9) numerically we found that the final result crucially depend on 
the initial fraction of cooperators. If it was greater than 0.6 then 
cooperation dominates otherwise defect is the evolutionary stable strategy 
as shown in the figure. 
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